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2. 
FOREWORD 
The Debris Team is continuing its effort to develop and 
implement measures to control damage from debris in the
	 - 
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control 
measures a part of routine processing and operations. 
ii
Shuttle Mission STS-48 was launched at 7:11 p.m. local 9/12/91
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1.0 S1ITTTm1ry	 - 
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 11 September 1991. The detailed walkdown of 
Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the primary flight 
elements OV-103 Discovery (13th flight), ET-42 (LWT-35), and 
BI-046 SRB's. There were no vehicle anomalies. Facility 
discrepancies were entered into OMI S0007, Appendix K, for 
resolution prior to cryoload. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 12 September 1991. 
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 
violations. There were no ice or TPS conditions outside of the 
established data base. There were no ET anomalies. Light 
condensate, but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage 
areas of the External Tank. Three Ice/Frost Team observation/ 
anomalies were documented and found acceptable for launch per 
the LCC and NSTS-08303. The LH2 umbilical leak sensor detected 
no significant hydrogen during the cryoload. The tubing was 
successfully removed from the vehicle with no TPS contact or 
damage. Ice Team inspection of the south holddown posts 
revealed debris in the haunch areas. The debris included a 
metal universal clamp, safety wire with lead seal, tie wrap 
fragments, and cork closeout trimmings. The debris was removed 
by the Ice Team prior to launch. 
A debris inspection of Pad 39A was performed after launch. No 
flight hardware or TPS materials were found with the exception 
of two Orbiter base heat shield Q-felt plugs. Launch damage to 
the holddown posts was minimal. EPON shim material on the south 
hoiddown posts was intact and bonded to the shoes. Frangible 
nut/ordnance fragments were visible resting on the stud in 
holddown post #5. The GH2 vent line had latched properly. 
Damage to the facility overall was minimal. 
A total of 117 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. After liftoff, 5 ordnance fragments including two NSI 
booster pieces or frangible nut webs (3 inches in length), fell 
from the HDP #5 DCS/stud hole. Two dark particles were visible 
between the aft skirt foot and the HDP #7 shoe, but could not 
be identified as ordnance fragments. These particles may have 
been pieces of shim putty or shim material. This was the third 
flight utilizing the new optimized frangible links. There was 
no evidence of stud hang-ups on any of the holddown posts. Two 
large orange flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent 
at T+29 seconds MET from SSME #2 and at T+31 seconds MET from 
SSME #1. At T+58 seconds MET, the vehicle passed through a 
layer of moisture or high cirrus ice particles and a bright 
cloud of condensation/reflection surrounded the vehicle. The 
event was caused by atmospheric effects and was not a vehicle 
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problem. SRB separation was nominal. Orbiter performance, 
landing gear extension, wheel touchdown, and vehicle rollout 
after landing were normal. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. Both frustums exhibited a total of 77 debonds over 
fasteners. The field joint protection system closeouts were in 
generally good condition. The aft booster stiffener ring splice 
plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
Although all HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were 
seated, post flight disassembly of the DCS housings revealed 
loss of ordnance debris -from HDP #2 and #5. The overall system 
debris retention averaged 92 percent. 
A 2.9" x 2.75" area of MSA-2 was missing from the LH frustum on 
the stiffener below the BSM's near the 381 ring. A laboratory 
analysis was performed at MSFC on the MSA-2 divot area. 
Examination of the surrounding material showed that the exposed 
surfaces were clean and free of sooting/charring/ heat effects 
in an aero-thermal environment. Hypalon peelback occurred 
laterally and was not in the direction of the nosecone (forward 
flight). The report concluded the MSA-2 was lost either during 
the late stages of descent, at water impact, or during 
retrieval operations. 
The upper left and lower right BSM covers on the LH frustum had 
locked in the fully opened position and then had been sub-
sequently deformed. The lower right attach ring was fractured 
at one location. The upper right BSM cover was missing. The 
substrate at the fracture planes, including the threads of the 
exposed screws, were sooted. Curved TPS cuts/substrate indenta-
tions near the location of the missing cover matched the size 
of a BSM cover lip. A laboratory analysis was performed on the 
remaining attach hardware of the missing aero heatshield cover. 
It should be noted that covers have been lost on seven previous 
flights (STS-2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 17, 28) and were attributed to 
re-entry, water impact, or retrieval operations. The analysis 
of the STS-48 damage showed that the cover did not fail prior 
to BSM firing. (Radar data at the time of BSM firing and SRB 
separation could not conclusively prove the forward BSM cover 
came off in the vicinity of the Orbiter) . There were no unusual 
aero loads during the ascent and separation phases which could 
cause the loss of the cover. (Max Q for the SRB's occurs during 
re-entry) . A gouge in the cork, which was attributed to an 
impact from the lost cover, just forward and between the two 
upper cover positions negated the possibility of losing the 
cover during ascent or separation. The MSFC study concluded the 
cover came off during re-entry and was not a debris threat to 
the Orbiter. However, the report did not explain why normal 
aerodynamic loading during re-entry caused this kind of damage. 
The IFA was closed based on the results of the study. 
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A detailed post landing inspection of OV-103 (Discovery) was 
conducted on September 18-19, 1991, at Ames-Dryden (EAFB) in 
the Mate-Demate Device. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 
182 hits, of which 25 had a major dimension of one inch or 
greater. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 100 hits, of 
which 14 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on 
these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous 
missions of similar configuration, the total number of hits was 
slightly greater than average and the number of hits with a 
major dimension of 1 inch or larger was slightly less than 
average. A greater than previously observed number of damage 
sites were noted on the perimeter tiles of Orbiter windows #1 
through #6. Most of the impact sites were only surface coating 
losses or were no more than 1/16th inch deep. This damage may 
have been caused by. the RTV used to bond paper covers to the 
FRCS nozzles. A cluster of 7 hits with one larger than one inch 
(3" x 2" x 1") was present on the leading edge of the vertical 
stabilizer near the root. Damage in this area is uncommon and 
may possibly be related to the damage around the forward 
facing windows. The ET/ORB separation ordnance device plungers 
were seated and appeared to have functioned properly. 
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window 
samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, natural landing site products, organics, and 
paint. The lower surface tile sample indicated localized 
heating from re-entry. The residual sample recovered from the 
damage site indicated tile repair material and a material 
variety similar to that observed in the window sample area. 
The ET/Orbiter samples provided indications of Shuttle Program 
processing and earthen environment residuals. This data does 
not indicate a single source of damaging debris and all of the 
materials are similar to those documented in previous post-
landing sample reports. 
A total of eight Post Launch Anomalies, including one IFA 
candidate, were observed during this mission assessment. 
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2.0 KSC ICE/FROST/DEBRIS TEAM ACTIVITIES 
Team Composition: NASA KSC, NASA MSFC, NASA JSC, 
LSOC SPC, RI - DOWNEY, IMSS - MAE, 
USBI - BPC, MTI - UTAH 
Team Activities: 
1) Prelaunch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objective: Identify and evaluate potential debris 
material/sources.	 Baseline debris and 
debris sources existing from previous 
launches. 
Areas: MLP deck, ORB and SRB flame exhaust 
holes, FSS, Shuttle external surfaces 
Time: L - 1 day 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.030 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle and launch pad to identify 
and resolve potential debris sources. 
The prelaunch vehicle and pad 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S6444 
Report: Generate PR'S and recommend corrective 
actions to pad managers. 
2) Launch Countdown Firing Room 2 
Objective: Evaluate ice/frost accumulation on the 
Shuttle and/or any observed debris 
utilizing OTV cameras. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 6 hours to Launch + 1 hour or 
propellant drain 
Requirements: OSD SOOFBO.005 - Monitor and video 
tape record ET TPS surfaces during 
loading through prepressurization. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: OIS call to NTD, Launch Director, and 
Shuttle managers. Generate IPR's.
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3) Ice/Frost TPS and Debris Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate any ice formation as 
potential debris material. Identify 
and evaluate any ORB, ET, or SRB TPS 
anomaly which may be a debris source 
or safety of flight concern. Identify 
and evaluate any other possible 
facility or vehicle anomaly. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 3 hours (during 2 hour BIH) 
Requirements: OSD S00U0O.020 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle for ice/frost, TPS, and 
debris anomalies after cryo propellant 
loading.	 Evaluate, document, and 
photograph all anomalies. During the 
walkdown, inspect Orbiter aft engine 
compartment (externally) for water 
condensation and/or ice formation in 
or between aft compartment tiles. An 
IR scan is required during the Shuttle 
inspection to verify ET surface temp-
eratures.	 During the walkdown inspect 
ET TPS areas which cannot be observed 
by the OTV system. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: Briefing to NTD, Launch Director, 
Shuttle management; generate IPR's. 
4)	 Post Launch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objectives: Locate and identify debris that could 
have damaged the Shuttle during launch 
Areas: MLP zero level, flame exhaust holes 
and trenches, FSS, pad surfaces and 
slopes, extension of trenches to the 
perimeter fence, walkdown of the beach 
from Playalinda to Complex 40, aerial 
overview of inaccessible areas. 
Time: Launch + 1 hours (after pad safing, 
before washdown) 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.010 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post launch pad/area inspection t.o 
identify any lost flight or ground 
systems hardware and resultant debris 
sources. The post launch pad and area 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444
Report:	 Initial report to NTD and verbal 
briefing to Level II at L+8 hours; 
generate PR's. 
5)	 Launch Data Review 
Objective: Detailed review of high speed films 
video tapes, and photographs from pad 
cameras, range trackers, aircraft and 
vehicle onboard cameras to determine 
possible launch damage to the flight 
vehicle. Identify debris and debris 
sources. 
Time: Launch + 1 day to Launch + 6 days 
Requirements: OMRSD S00U00.011 - An engineering film 
review and analysis shall be performed 
on all engineering launch film as soon 
as possible to identify any debris 
damage to the Shuttle. Identify flight 
flight vehicle or ground system damage 
that could affect orbiter flight 
operations or future SSV launches. 
Documents: OMI S6444 
Report: Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team starting on L+1 day 
through landing; generate PR's. 
6) SRB Post Flight/Retrieval Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate potential SRB debris sources. 
Data will be correlated with observed 
Orbiter post landing TPS damage. 
Areas : SR.B external surfaces (Hangar AF, 
CCAFS) 
Time: Launch + 24 hours (after on-dock, 
before hydrolasing) 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.013 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post retrieval inspection 
of the SRB's to identify any damage 
caused by launch debris.
	 Anomalies 
must be documented/photographed and 
coordinated with the results of the 
post launch shuttle/pad area debris 
inspection. 
Documents: OMI B8001 
Report: Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team. Preliminary report 
to SRB Disassembly Evaluation Team. 
Generate PR's.
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7) Orbiter Post Landing Debris Damage Assessment 
Objective: Identify and evaluate areas of Orbiter 
TPS damage due to debris and correlate 
if possible, source and time of 
occurrence. Additionally, runways are 
inspected for debris/sources of debris 
Areas: Orbiter TPS surfaces, runways 
Time: After vehicle safing on runway, before 
towing 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.040 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform a 
prelanding runway inspection to 
identify, document, and collect debris 
that could result in orbiter damage. 
Runway debris and any facility anomal-
ies which cannot be removed/corrected 
by the Team shall be documented and 
photographed; the proper management 
authority shall be notified and 
corrective actions taken. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.050 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post landing runway inspection to 
identify and resolve potential debris 
sources that may have caused vehicle 
damage but was not present or was not 
identified during pre-launch runway 
inspection. Obtain photographic 
documentation of any debris, debris 
sources, or flight hardware that may 
have been lost on landing. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.060 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall map, 
document, and photograph debris-
related Orbiter TPS damage and debris 
sources. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.012 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post landing inspection of 
the orbiter vehicle to identify any 
damage caused by launch debris. Any 
anomalies must be documented/ 
photographed and coordinated with the 
results of the post launch shuttle/ 
pad area debris inspection. 
Requirements: OSD V09AJO.095 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
temperature measurements of RCC nose 
cap and RCC RH wing leading edge 
panels 9 and 17. 
Documents: OMI S0026, OMI S0027, OMI S0028
Report:	 Briefing to NASA Convoy Commander 
and generate PR's. Preliminary 
report to Level II on the day of 
landing followed by a more detailed 
update the next day. 
8) Level II report 
Objective:	 Compile and correlate data from all 
inspections and analyses. Results 
of the debris assessment, along 
with recommendations for corrective 
actions, are presented directly to 
Level II via SIR and PRCB. Paper 
copy of complete report follows in 
3 to 4 weeks. (Ref NASA Technical 
Memorandum series) 
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3.0 PEE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Frost/Debris Team briefing for launch activities was 
conducted on 11 September 1991 at 1500 hours with the following 
key personnel present:
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Processing, Debris Assess 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
A. Biamonte NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
J. Hoffman LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Mech Systems 
R. Seale LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
J. Blue LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
W. Richards LSQC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
D. Thorpe LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
M. Dean LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
Z. Byrns NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
C. Gray MMC	 - MAF ET TPS & Materials Design 
S. Copsey MMC	 - MAF ET TPS Testing/Certif 
J. McClymonds RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
K. Mayer RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
S. Otto MMC	 - LSS ET Processing 
G. Witters USBI - LSS SRB Processing 
J. Cook MTI	 - LSS SRN Processing 
M. Barber LSOC - SPC Safety Engineering 
These personnel participated in various	 team	 activities, 
assisted	 in	 the collection	 and evaluation	 of	 data,	 and 
contributed to reports contained in this document.
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3.1 PEE-LAUNCH SSV/PIU) DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 11 September 1991 from 1600 - 1720 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-103 Discovery (13th flight), ET-42 
(LWT-35), and BI-046 SRB' s. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
There were no vehicle anomalies. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload/ 
launch, temporary hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and LD55 were 
installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical until a permanent sensor 
could be designed and installed. The tygon tubes are intended 
to remain in place during cryogenic loading and be removed by 
the Ice Inspection Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
An electrical conduit box cover adjacent to the Portable Purge 
Unit (PPU) outlets on the MLP zero level (northwest corner) was 
loose. 
Holddown post hardware lay on the MLP deck near the northeast 
corner of the RH SRB exhaust hole. 
Cleanup of the MLP deck and pad surface was almost complete at 
the time of the inspection. A universal hose clamp lay near the 
base of HDP #5. Tape and a plastic bag lay on the HDP #1 
haunch. Debris, such as safety wire, tie wraps, K5NA pieces, 
and instafoam trimmings were present on all the south hoiddown 
post haunch areas. 
The facility discrepancies were worked real-time or entered 
into OMI S0007, Appendix K, for resolution prior to vehicle 
tanking.
11
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Universal metal clamp lay on the hoiddown post haunch near the 
base of HDP #5 
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K5NA and instafoam trimmings, tie wrap pieces, and other debris 
were present around the bases of the south hoiddown posts and 
in the haunch areas
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4.0 LAUNCH 
STS-48 was launched at 12:23:11:04 GMT (7:11:04 p.m. local) on 
12 September 1991. 
4.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 12 September 1991 from 1320 to 1530 hours during 
the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 84.0 F 
Relative Humidity: 63.9 % 
Wind Speed:	 7.8 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 029 Degrees 
The portable STI infrared scanner was utilized to obtain sur-
face temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment 
of the vehicle, as shown in Figure 1 and 2. 
4.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile anomalies were observed. All RCS paper covers 
were intact. There was no evidence of a leak or a liquid level 
line on any of the RCS paper covers. The water spray boiler 
plugs were intact. The average Orbiter surface temperature was 
85 degrees F. The average surface temperatures of the engine 
mounted heat shields were 75 degrees F for SS #1, 73 degrees 
F for SS #2, and 77 degrees F for SS #3. All of the SSME
 
heat shields were wet with some condensate. Light frost coated 
the SSME #1 heat shield-to-nozzle interface at the 3-10 o'clock 
position and the SS #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interface at the 
3-4, 5-10, and 12 o'clock positions. No GOX vapors originated 
from inside the SSME nozzles. Some condensate was present on 
base heat shield tiles between SS
	 #2 and #3 and outboard of 
ss	 #2. 
4.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH 
SRB case surface temperatures between 81 and 88 degrees F. In 
comparison, the Cyclops radiometer gave measurements between. 77 
and 90 degrees F and the SRB GEl showed temperatures between 86 
and 99 degrees F. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Tempera-
ture (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 81 degrees F, which was within 
the required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
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4.4 EXTERNAL T2NI 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 1100 to 1900 hours and the results tabulated in Figures 3 
and 4. The program predicted condensate with no ice accumula-
tion on all TPS acreage surfaces. 
There was no ice/frost accumulation or condensate on the L02 
tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS anomalies. 
The tumble valve cover was intact. There were no anomalies on 
the pressurization line and support ramps. The STI measured 
surface temperatures from 115 (sun) to 81 (shade) degrees F on 
the ogive and from 97 (sun) to 79 (shade) degrees F on the 
barrel section. In comparison, SURFICE predicted 71 degrees F 
on the ogive and 67 degrees F on the barrel and the Cyclops IR 
radiometer measured temperatures from 122 (sun) to 77 (shade) 
on the ogive and from 103 (sun) to 74 (shade) degrees F on the 
barrel. 
The intertank TPS acreage was dry. There were no TPS anomalies. 
One small frost spot appeared in a stringer valley at the LH2 
tank-to-intertank +Y-Z flange. No unusual vapors or ice forma-
tions were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. Both the 
STI and the Cyclops IR radiometer measured surface temperatures 
that averaged 107 in the sun and 83 in the shade. 
The upper LH2 tank acreage was dry. The lower LH2 tank acreage 
and aft dome TPS acreage were covered with a light amount of 
condensate. There were no ice/frost accumulations on the 
acreage. The STI measured surface temperatures from 92 (sun) to 
72 (shade) degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and from 81 (sun) to 
68 (shade) degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. In comparison, 
SURFICE predicted 64 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 69 
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. The Cyclops IR radiometer 
measured temperatures from 96 (sun) to 72 (shade) degrees F on 
the upper LH2 tank and from 83 (sun) to 70 (shade) degrees F on 
the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, PAL ramp, cable 
tray/press line ice/frost ramps, longerons, thrust struts, 
manhole covers, or aft dome apex. Some ice/frost was present in 
the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut fairing expansion joints. 
Ice/frost covered the lower EB fittings outboard to the strut 
pin hole with condensate on the rest of the fitting. The struts 
were dry. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in all L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The purge 
barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding posi-
tive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of ice/frost 
on the baggie or on the acreage, areas of the umbilical. 
Ice/frost fingers 3-6 inches in length had formed on the 
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separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents. Normal 
venting of nitrogen purge gas had occurred during tanking, 
stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost had formed in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and 
on both burst disks. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate. The outboard side of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical and 
purge barrier were covered by light ice/frost formations. Ice/ 
frost accumulation on the inboard and aft areas of the baggie 
was nonexistent. Ice/frost fingers 3-6 inches in length had 
formed on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. A small 
amount of ice/frost had formed on the aft pyrotechnic canister 
outboard bondline. Normal venting of helium purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. There 
were no unusual vapors emanating from the umbilicals nor any 
evidence of cryogenic drips. No ice or frost was present on the 
cable tray vent hole. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access 
port foam plug was properly closed out with no ice/frost on the 
bondline. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle with no flight hardware contact or TPS damage. 
The summary of Ice/Frost. Team observations/ anomalies consisted 
of 3 OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 (documentation only) noted ice/frost accumulations 
on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents, purge barrier 
(baggie), aft pyrotechnic canister closeout bondline, and the 
LH2 recirculation line bellows and burst disks. All of these 
accumulations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. These 
formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) noted ice/frost formations on 
the L02 ET/ORB umbilical pyrotechnic canister purge vents with 
typical ice/frost fingers. These formations were acceptable per 
NSTS-08303.
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4.5 FACILITY 
Ice Team inspection of the south holddown posts revealed debris 
in the haunch areas. The largest piece, a universal metal 
clamp, had been entered in S0007, Appendix K, during the Pre-
Launch SSV/Pad Debris Inspection the previous day. In addition, 
a piece of safety wire with lead seal, tie wrap fragments, and 
cork closeout trimmings were present. The debris was removed 
using the ice net. Post launch assessment of the event revealed 
lack of coordination between pad operations work and quality 
verification. A change to Appendix K will provide more detailed 
information on a debris anomaly, location, point of contact, 
responsible organization, and method of verification. 
One potential debris concern was identified during the ice/ 
frost inspection of the vehicle. The handrails on the FSS 115 
foot level RBUS platform near the Orbiter LH wingtip were 
bolted in place rather than welded. Facility Engineering 
reported the configuration had been approved for launch. 
Welding of the handrails is planned/scheduled after launch. 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines. There was also no apparent 
leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. The modification 
to the GH2 vent line prevented ice from forming, but some 
ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP legs 
and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. There were no icicles on the GOX 
vent ducts.
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Overall view of OV-103, ET-42 (LWT 35), and BI-046 SR-B's 
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There were no TPS anomalies or ice/frost accumulations on the 
External Tank acreage 
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Overall view of SSHE cluster. Some ice/frost had formed at the 
SSME #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interface. 
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Ice/frost accumulations in the L02 feedline upper bellows
and support brackets were typical 
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Ice/frost formations in the L02 feedline support brackets 
were typical 
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Ice/frost formations in the L02 feedline lower bellows
and support brackets were typical 
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Fii. 
Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on 
the pyro canister purge vents were typical. There were no 
acreage TPS anomalies or ice/frost accumulations.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. There were no unusual 
vapors emanating from the umbilical nor any evidence of 
cryogenic drips. Ice/frost accumulations on the umbilical out 
board side and on the purge vents were typical. Ice/frost in 
the recirculation line bellows and burst disks was typical. 
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P0071-1, 
Less than usual ice/frost had accumulated on the inboard and 
aft sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost formations on 
the lower plate gap purge vent and in the LH2 recirculation 
line bellows were typical. The LH2 feedline bellows, cable tray 
vent hole, and 17-inch flapper valve actuator tool access port 
closeout exhibited no ice or frost accumulations.
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5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The MLP deck and FSS were inspected approximately two hours 
after launch on 12 September 1991. No flight hardware or TPS 
materials were found. However, frangible nut fragments were 
visible resting on top of the stud in hoiddown post #5. The 
inspection of the MLP deck, pad apron, and pad acreage areas 
resumed on 13 September 1991 from 1500-1730 hours. The only 
flight hardware recovered consisted of two Orbiter base heat 
shield Q-felt plugs near the Engine Service Platform park site 
on the crawlerway slope. 
Plume erosion of the south SRB holddown posts was typical. All 
EPON shim sidewall material and bottom plate material was 
intact and bonded to the shoes. There was no visual indication 
of a stud hang-up on any of the south hoiddown posts. North 
hoiddown post doghouse blast covers were in the closed position 
and exhibited typical plume erosion. The SRB aft skirt purge 
lines were in place but slightly damaged. The SRB T-0 umbilical 
and connector saver sacrificial pieces showed normal plume 
impingement effects. 
The OAA and TSM's showed the usual minor post launch damage. 
The Hydrogen Dispersal System structure was undamaged. The GOX 
vent arm was locked in the retracted position and exhibited 
minor launch damage. The GH2 vent arm appeared to have 
retracted nominally, was latched on the eighth tooth of the 
latching mechanism, and had no loose cables. The ET intertank 
access structure sustained typical plume heating effects. 
Damage to the facility appeared to be minimal. Facility debris 
was typical and included fasteners, identification plates, 
clamps, and an alarm bell. The handrails on the FSS 115 foot 
level RBUS platform remained in place with no apparent damage. 
No emergency egress slidewire baskets had released during 
launch. 
Expanded inspection of the launch area included the areas 
outside the pad perimeter, railroad tracks, the beach from 
UCS-10 to the Titan complex, the beach access road, and the 
ocean areas under the vehicle flight path. No flight hardware 
was found. 
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 56 particles 
were imaged in the T+137 to 329 second time period. Seventeen 
of the particles were imaged by only one radar, 27 particles 
were imaged by two radars, and 12 particles was imaged by all 
three radars.
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Post flight inspection of the LH SRB frustum revealed a missing 
forward BSM aero heatshield cover. Radar data was analyzed with 
the intent of identifying the cover falling away from the 
vehicle if the failure occurred at the time of SRB separation 
while in proximity to the Orbiter. Pieces of slag, which are 
propelled out of the SRB's and have a velocity of 900-1200 
m/sec, were readily discernible. Slag particles exhibit a con-
tinuous signal return since there is always a broad reflective 
surface. Aft BSM covers also have high velocity but exhibit an 
on-off-on again signal as the flat plates tumble. The search 
focused on a flat plate type of return with low velocity, which 
might be characteristic of an object falling off the vehicle. 
Two radars imaged an object that appeared to separate from the 
vehicle in the T+124 second time frame, had a velocity of 200-
300 m/sec, and exhibited a tumbling flat plate type of signal 
return. However, the object appeared before BSM firing and the 
signal return was not strong, as would be expected from a 
metallic object such as an aero heatshield cover. The object 
was most likely a flat piece of SRB slag. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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Plume erosion of the south SRB holddown posts was typical. All 
EPON shim sidewall material and shim bottom plate material was 
intact and bonded to the shoes. There was no visual indication 
of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. 
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North HDP blast covers were in the closed position and 
exhibited typical SRB plume erosion effects 
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Frangible nut/ordnance fragments lay on the stud in HDP #5. 
These fragments had not been retained by the Debris Containment 
System (DCS) and fell from the aft skirt stud hole shortly 
after liftoff.
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6.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
A total of 117 film and video data items, which included 
forty-four videos, forty-two 16nuu films, twenty-six 35mm 
films, and five 70nun films were reviewed starting on launch 
day. 
No IFA's were generated as a result of the film and video data 
review. Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and 
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 10. 
6.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMBX 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
Helium purge vapors and ice build-up on the LH2 ET/ORB umbili-
cal had been typical during tanking, stable replenish, flight 
pressurization, and launch. There were no unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips during liftoff. 
SSME ignition and Mach diamond formation appeared normal. Free 
burning hydrogen was blown upward to the OMS pods and under the 
body flap by prevailing winds (OTV 051, 060, 063, 070, TV-4, 
E-1, 3, 19, 20) 
SSME ignition vibration/acoustics caused numerous pieces of 
ice/frost to fall from the L02 and LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilicals. 
No damage to Orbiter tiles or ET TPS was visible (OTV 009, 054, 
063). Pieces of ice continued to fall from the umbilical area 
during early ascent. One piece of ice fell aft from the L02 
feedline upper bellows and may have made two "glancing" 
contacts with tiles on the Orbiter lower surface (OTV 061, 
E-40). No tile damage was visible. East winds caused the ice 
particle to traverse the Orbiter underside and pass outboard of 
the EO-2 fitting. 
SSME ignition vibration/acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from seven locations between the RH 
OMS and SSME's #1/#3, one location on the aft face of the RH 
RCS stinger, and one location at the base of the RH OMS nozzle 
(E-23). A 2"xl" piece of tile surface coating material fell 
from the aft surface of the LH RCS stinger (E-24). In addition, 
a 4-inch flexible strip of material, most likely a gap filler, 
appeared to originate from tiles on the aft face of the LH OMS 
pod near the OMS nozzle. 
One FRSI plug fell from a carrier panel on the base heat shield 
shortly after liftoff (E-18).
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There were no major facility anomalies. No swing arms or other 
pad structures contacted the vehicle during liftoff. Disconnect 
and retraction of all T-0 umbilicals was nominal. Separation of 
the GUCP from the External Tank was nominal. The GH2 vent arm 
retracted and latched with no rebound. There was no excessive 
slack in the static retract lanyard. 
All rainbirds on the ML? deck activated properly at T-0 (OTV 
060) 
After liftoff, 5 ordnance fragments including two NSI booster 
pieces or frangible nut webs (3 inches in length), fell from 
the HDP #5 DCS/stud hole (E-12) . Two dark particles were 
visible between the aft skirt foot and the HDP #7 shoe, but 
could not be identified as ordnance fragments. These particles 
may have been pieces of shim putty or shim material (E-11). 
This was the third flight utilizing the new optimized frangible 
links. There was no evidence of stud hang-ups on any of the 
holddown posts. Closure of doghouse blast covers was nominal. 
One piece of aft skirt instafoam broke off near the RH SRB HPU 
exhaust horn/HDP #3 after liftoff (E-10, 15). 
Numerous pieces of SRB throat plug material were ejected out of 
the SRB flame trench north of the vehicle (E-62, 64). More SRB 
throat plug material was ejected upward out of the SRB exhaust 
holes (E-64) . This is a common occurrence and none of the 
material was a threat to the vehicle. 
Two clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after 
completion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers (E-54, 59, 207). 
Other pieces of RCS paper covers were visible passing over the 
Orbiter wings. Pieces of ET/ORE purge barrier baggie material 
were also visible caught in the aerodynamic recirculation and 
falling aft of the vehicle (E-207, 213, 222, 223, 224) 
Numerous white flashes occurred in the SSME plume during and 
shortly after the roll maneuver (E-54, 222). These flashes have 
been observed on previous launches. A total of fifteen orange 
streaks occurred in the SSME plume during ascent (E-207, 212, 
223). These streaks are typically caused by debris particles, 
such as RCS paper covers. 
Two large orange flashes occurred in the SSME plume during 
ascent at T+29 seconds MET from SSME #2 and at T+31 seconds MET 
from SSME #1 (TV-4, E-54). At T+58 seconds MET, the vehicle 
passed through a layer of moisture or high cirrus ice particles 
and a bright cloud of condensation/reflection surrounded the 
vehicle. The event was caused by atmospheric effects and was 
not a vehicle problem.
I]
Just after the roll maneuver and during ascent, over 100 light 
colored particles dropped out of the LH SRB plume. These 
particles are believed to be pieces of SRB aft skirt instafoam 
or SRB propellant (E-54, 59, 207, 213, 221, 222, 223, 224) 
Four pieces of SRB thermal curtain tape came loose during 
ascent. SSME closeout blankets were intact while in the field 
of view. (E-207, 212) 
Movement of the body flap appeared similar in amplitude and 
frequency to that observed on previous flights (E-207). 
Late in flight during the period of plume recirculation, four 
bright flashes occurred on the SS #1 nozzle and were most 
likely sunlight reflections (E-207). ET aft dome charring and 
plume recirculation appeared normal. 
SRB separation appeared nominal (E-207, 223). No unusual SRB 
plume events, such as localized brightening, occurred (TV-4, 
TV-13) . However, two puffs of black smoke associated with 
tailoff were visible.
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Shortly after liftoff, five ordnance fragments including two 
NSI booster pieces or frangible nut webs (3 inches in length), 
fell from the HDP #5 DCS/stud hole. 
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Numerous pieces of SRB throat plug material were ejected out of 
the SBB flame trench north of the vehicle. More SRB throat plug 
material was ejected upward out of the SRB exhaust holes. This 
is a common occurrence and none of the material was a threat to 
the vehicle.
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Two large orange flashes occurred in the SSME plume during 
ascent at T+29 seconds MET from SS!.
 #2 and at T+31 seconds MET 
from SSME #1.
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Pieces of paper covers from the LH FWD RCS fell past the aft 
end of the Orbiter (top photo). Orange streaks in the SSME 
plume are typically caused by debris particles, such as the RCS 
paper covers, entering the plume (bottom photo)
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
Orange flashes within the SSME plume itself may be 
indicative of fuel impurities. 
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At T+58 seconds MET, the vehicle passed through a layer of 
cirrus clouds containing moisture or ice particles and a bright 
cloud of condensation/reflection surrounded the vehicle. The 
event was caused by atmospheric effects and was not a vehicle 
problem.
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
OV-103 was not equipped to carry umbilical cameras. Insuffi-
cient light due to the late time of launch prevented the crew 
from photographing the External Tank after separation from the 
Orbiter (DTO-0312). 
6.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
Orbiter performance, landing gear extension, wheel touchdown, 
and vehicle rollout after landing were nominal. Additional 
detail was not visible due to the dark conditions of a night 
landing. Infrared scanning of the Orbiter showed tire heat 
soak, APU exhausts, and nosecap/wing leading edge RCC panels 
were all normal.
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7.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 15 September 1991 from 
0900 to 1230 hours. In general, the SRB's appeared to be in 
good condition. 
7.1 RH SOLID ROT BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
I-
 The RH frustum had no areas of missing TPS but had 26 MSA-2 
debonds over fasteners. There was minor localized blistering of 
the Hypalon paint (Figure 5). All BSM covers were locked in the 
fully opened position. 
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. The forward 
separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred 
forward of the ET/SRB attach point (Figure 6). 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, and lEA appeared undamaged. All three aft 
booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage at 
approximately 270-360 degrees. Water impact damage also 
occurred on the upper strut fairing (milk can) . The aft booster 
stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA 
material was missing. However, some of the K5NA had been 
applied beyond the splice plate closeout and overlapped the 
instafoam. The foam erodes or shrinks leaving the K5NA overlap 
exposed, which creates a mechanism for debris. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Five 
K5NA protective domes between HDP #1 and #3 were lost from 
bolt heads on the aft side of the phenolic kick ring prior to 
water impact (sooted substrate). The aft skirt acreage TPS was 
in good condition (Figure 7). K5NA was missing from all aft BSM 
nozzles. 
All four HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were 
seated. This was the third flight utilizing the optimized link. 
There was no sign of broaching in any of the stud holes. HDP #3 
and HDP #4 EPON shim sidewall material was lost prior to water 
impact. MSFC will review the bonding process. 
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The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 26 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners.
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The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both 
RSS antenna phenolic plates were intact. Minor blistering of 
the Hypalon paint occurred forward of the ET/SRB attach point. 
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Overall view of the RH SRN cases. The Field Joint Protection 
System closeouts were generally in good condition.
OR1GNAL P.CE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
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Post flight condition of the RH aft booster. The aft skirt 
acreage TPS was sooted but in good condition. 
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K5NA protective domes were lost from bolt heads on the aft side 
of the phenolic kick ring prior to water impact and exhibited a 
sooted substrate.
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7.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum had 51 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners (Figure 8). 
A 2.9"x2.75" area of MSA-2 was missing from two fasteners on 
the stiffener below the BSM's near the 381 ring. The MSA-2 had 
separated completely from the substrate. The MSA-2 fracture 
edges and surrounding Hypalon paint were not sooted/charred, 
the exposed MSA-2 material was clean, and no unusual heating 
effects were visible. Samples were taken for laboratory 
analysis at MSFC. There was minor localized blistering of the 
Hypalon paint on the acreage areas of the frustum. 
The upper left and lower right BSM covers had locked in the 
fully opened position and then had been subsequently deformed. 
The lower right attach ring was fractured at one location. The 
upper right BSM cover was missing. The substrate at the 
fracture planes, including the threads of the exposed screws, 
were sooted. Curved TPS cuts/substrate indentations near the 
location of the missing cover matched the size of a BSM cover 
lip. There was no evidence that unusual aerodynamic loading had 
occurred on the frustum. The fractured attach rings were 
removed for laboratory analysis at MSFC. 
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. The forward 
separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred 
forward of the ET/SRB attach point (Figure 9). 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl 
cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of 
the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, and lEA appeared undamaged. All three aft 
booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage at 
approximately 210-270 degrees. The aft booster stiffener ring 
splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was 
missing. However, some of the K5NA had been applied beyond the 
splice plate closeout and overlapped the instafoam. The foam 
erodes or shrinks leaving the K5NA overlap exposed, which 
creates a mechanism for debris. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring delaminated at several 
locations. Thirty-three K5NA protective dome were missing from 
bolt heads on the aft side of the phenolic kick ring. Five of 
these domes were lost prior to water impact (charred 
substrate). The aft skirt acreage TPS was in good condition. 
K5NA was missing from all aft BSM nozzles (Figure 10). 
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All four HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were 
seated. This was the third flight utilizing the optimized link. 
There was no sign of broaching in any of the stud holes. HDP #7 
and HDP #8 EPON shim sidewall material was lost prior to water 
impact. MSFC will review the bonding process. 
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The LH frustum had 51 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Damage 
occurred to the forward BSM aero heatshield covers/attach rings 
and a piece of MSA-2 was missing near the 381 ring. BSM residue 
and sooting were typical. There was no evidence that unusual 
aerodynamic loading had occurred on the frustum. 
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A 2.9" x 2.75" area of MSA-2 was missing near the 381 ring. The 
MSA-2 had separated completely from the substrate. The exposed 
surfaces of the surrounding material were clean and free of 
sooting/charring/heat effects. Hypalon peelback occurred 
laterally and was not in the direction of the nosecone. The 
MSA-2 was lost during the later stages of descent, at water 
impact, or during retrieval operations. 
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The LH frustum upper left and lower right BSM aero heatshield 
cover attach rings/hinges were deformed. The upper right cover 
was missing and the attach ring/hinge exhibited a ductile 
failure. Curved TPS cuts/substrate indentations (arrow) near 
the location of the missing cover matched the size of a BSM 
cover lip.
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The lower right BSM aero heatshield cover attach ring/hinge had 
been deformed some time after being locked in the fully opened 
position. The attach ring was fractured at one location. 
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The substrate at the fracture planes, including the threads of 
the exposed screws, were sooted. MSFC laboratory analysis of 
the attach ring concluded the failure did not occur prior to or 
during BSH firing. There were no unusual aerodynamic loads 
during ascent or descent that could have caused the failure. 
SRB Max Q occurs during re-entry. 
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The left forward skirt exhibited no MSA-2 debonds. Minor 
blistering of Hypalon paint occurred forward of the ET/SRB 
attach point. The RSS antenna phenolic plates were intact. 
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Post flight condition of the LH aft booster/aft skirt. The aft 
skirt acreage TPS was sooted but generally in good condition 
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K5NA protective domes were missing from bolt heads on the 
phenolic kick ring prior to water impact. The substrate under 
the missing domes was sooted. 
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il 
Aft skirt foot (sooted substrate) reveals part of the EPON shim 
material was missing prior to water impact. 
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7.3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 92 percent and 
individual holddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without
HDP # 2 large halves 
1 99 
2 84 
3 99 
4 99 
5 73 
6 99 
7 99 
8 99
% of Ordnance 
fragments % Overall 
99 99 
95 88 
93 99 
97 99 
32 58 
97 99 
92 98 
99 99 
STS-48 was the third flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. Overall percentages of retention for the three flights 
utilizing the "optimized" link are: 
BI-044 B1045 BI-046 
HDP # STS-40 STS-43 STS-48 
1 99% 98% 99% 
2 99% 31% 88% 
3 38% 99% 99% 
4 99% 99% 99% 
5 23% 99% 58% 
6 99% 99% 99% 
7 62% 99% 99% 
8 99% 99% 99% 
TOTAL 78% 90% 92% 
Debris Loss 58 oz 25 oz 19 oz
A laboratory analysis (ref tYSBI Rpt No. M&P-3033-059-91 dated 
Sept. 18, 1991) was performed at MSFC on the LH frustum MSA-2 
divot area. Examination of the surrounding material showed that 
the exposed surfaces were clean and free of sooting/charring/ 
heat effects in an aero-thermal environment. Hypalon peelback 
occurred laterally and was not in the direction of the nosecone 
(forward flight) . The report concluded the MSA-2 was lost 
either during the late stages of descent, at water impact, or 
during retrieval operations.
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Laboratory analyses were also performed on the remaining attach 
hardware of the missing LH frustum BSM cover (ref USBI Rpt No. 
M&P-2017-053-91 dated October 1991 and the STS-48 BSM Aeroheat 
Shield Anomaly Investigation Strength Analysis Report) . It 
should be noted that covers have been lost on seven previous 
flights (STS-2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 17, 28) and were attributed to 
re-entry, water impact, or retrieval operations. The analysis 
of the STS-48 damage showed that the cover did not fail prior 
to BSM firing. (Radar data at the time of BSM firing and SRB 
separation could not conclusively prove the forward BSM cover 
came off in the vicinity of the orbiter). There were no unusual 
aero loads during the ascent and separation phases which could 
cause the loss of the cover. (SRB Max Q occurs during 
re-entry) . A gouge in the cork, which was attributed to an 
impact from the lost cover, just forward and beteen the two 
upper cover positions precluded the possibility of losing the 
cover during ascent or separation while the SRB was in forward 
flight. The MSFC study concluded the cover came off during 
re-entry and was not a debris threat to the Orbiter. The IFA 
was closed based on the results of the study. 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-103 (Discovery) was 
conducted on September 18 and 19, 1991, at Ames-Dryden (EAFB) 
in the Mate/Demate Device (D). This inspection was performed 
to identify debris impact damage, and if possible, debris 
sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 182 hits, of 
which 25 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. This 
total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat 
shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume 
recirculation. The following table breaks down the STS-48 
Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 14 100 
Upper surface 9 66 
Right side 0 5 
Left side 1 6 
Right OMS POD 0 2 
Left OMS POD 1 3 
TOTALS 25 182
The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 100 hits of which 14 
had a major dimension of one inch or greater. A comparison of 
these numbers to statistics from 30 previous missions of 
similar configuration (excluding missions STS-24, 25, 26, 26R, 
27R, and 30?. which had damage from known debris sources), indi-
cates that the total number of hits was slightly greater than 
average and the number of hits one inch or larger was slightly 
less than average. Figures 11 - 14 map the TPS debris damage 
for STS-48. 
Twelve of the fourteen hits greater than an inch on the lower 
surface occurred to the right of the Orbiter centerline. This 
pattern is consistent with ice originating from the ET L02 
feedline bellows and support brackets (waived ET ice). 
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. Although the inboard main landing gear tires 
exhibited some minor material loss, the main landing gear tires 
were considered to be in good condition for a concrete runway 
landing. 
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average. The 
main engine closeout blankets were in excellent condition with 
the only observed damage being minor fraying from 6:00 to 7:00 
o'clock on SSME #1.
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FIGURE 11. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 12. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 14. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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A thin orange GSE tile shim, approximately 1 inch by 1 inch in 
size, protruded from tiles at the bottom of the RH rudder speed 
brake near the hinge. GSE tile shim should not remain on the 
Orbiter for flight. 
Orbiter windows #1, #2, #5, & #6 were lightly hazed. Windows #3 
and #4 exhibited moderate to heavy hazing and had numerous 
streaks. Laboratory analysis was performed on samples taken 
from all windows (reference Figure 15 and Section 9.0) 
A greater than previously observed number of damage sites were 
noted on the perimeter tiles of Orbiter windows #1 through #6. 
Most of the impact sites were only surface coating losses or 
were no more than 1/16th inch deep. This damage may have been 
caused by the RTV used to bond paper covers to the FRCS 
nozzles. 
A cluster of 7 hits with one larger than one inch (31lx2"xl") 
was present on the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer near 
the root. Damage in this area is uncommon and may possibly be 
related to the damage around the forward facing windows. 
All ET/Orbiter separation ordnance device plungers functioned 
properly. The EO-1 separation assembly stop bolts did not 
sustain any deformation. The L02 ET/ORB umbilical face plate 
was wrinkled. This was probably caused by material shrinkage 
during cryogenic loading and was not considered to be an 
anomaly. 
A portable infrared thermometer was used to measure the surface 
temperatures of three areas on the Orbiter TPS after landing 
(OMRSD V09AJO.095). Seventy minutes after wheel stop, the 
Orbiter nosecap RCC was 112 degrees F, the RH wing leading edge 
RCC panel #9 was 89 degrees F, and the RH wing leading edge RCC 
panel #17 was 88 degrees Fahrenheit (reference Figure 16). 
Runway 15/33 was inspected by LSOC personnel on September 17, 
1991, and all potentially damaging debris was removed. Runway 
22 was inspected and swept by Air Force personnel. Both runways 
were determined to be in acceptable condition. 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was 
greater than average and the number of hits with a major 
dimension one inch or greater was near average when compared to 
previous flights as shown in the comparison charts (Figure 
17-19). The distribution of hits on the Orbiter lower surface 
does not point to a single source for ascent debris, but 
indicates a shedding of ice and TPS debris from random sources. 
Orbiter Post Landing Anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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STS-48 DEBRIS DAMAGE CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 16. STS-48 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS
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FIGURE 17: POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
> 1 INCH TOTAL 
STS-6 36 120 
STS-8 7 56 
STS-9 14 58 
STS-11 34 63 
STS-13 8 36 
STS-14 30 111 
STS-17 36 154 
STS-19 20 87 
STS-20 28 81 
STS-23 46 152 
STS-27 33 141 
STS-28 17 111 SINCE RETURN TO FLIGHT 
STS-30 34 183 
STS-31 55 257 > 1 INCH TOTAL 
STS-32 39 193 
STS-29 23 132 23 132 
STS-28R 20 76 20 76 
STS-34 18 53 18 53 
STS-33R 21 118 21 118 
STS-32R 15 120 15 120 
STS-36 19 81 19 81 
STS-31R 14 63 14 63 
STS-41 16 76 16 76 
STS-38 8 81 8 81 
STS-35 17 147 17 147 
STS-37 10 113 10 113 
STS-39 16 238 16 238 
STS-40 25 197 25 197 
STS-43 25 131 25 131 
STS-48 25 182 25 182 
SUM 709 3611 272 1808 
AVERAGE 23.6 120.4 18.1 120.5 
SIGMA 11.6 56 5.2 53
THIS ANALYSIS DOES NOT INCLUDE STS-24, 25, 26,26R, 27R, AND 30R 
THESE MISSIONS HAD DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN SOURCES 
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Typical tile damage on the Orbiter lower surface 
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Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average. The 
main engine closeout blankets were in excellent condition with 
only minor fraying damage on the SSME #1 blanket. 
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A thin, orange GSE tile shim, approximately 1 inch by 1 inch in 
size, protruded from tiles at the bottom of the RH rudder speed 
brake near the hinge.
87
	
	 PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
A cluster of 7 hits with one larger than one inch (3"x2"xl") 
was present on the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer near 
the root. Tile damage in this area is uncommon and may possibly 
be related to tile damage around the forward facing windows. 
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Orbiter windows #1 and #2 were lightly hazed. Window #3 
exhibited moderate to heavy hazing and had numerous streaks. A 
greater than previously observed number of damage sites 
occurred on the perimeter tiles of windows #1-#6. Most of the 
impact sites did not exceed a depth of 1/16th inch. This damage 
may have been caused by the RTV used to bond paper covers to 
the FRCS nozzles.
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Orbiter windows #5 and #6 were lightly hazed. Window #4 
exhibited moderate to heavy hazing and had numerous streaks. A 
greater than previously observed number of damage sites 
occurred on the perimeter tiles of windows #1-#6. Most of the 
impact sites did not exceed a depth of 1/16th inch. This damage 
may have been caused by the RTV used to bond paper covers to 
the FRCS nozzles.
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The separation 
ordnance device debris plunger in EO-3 was seated and appeared 
to have functioned properly. Wrinkling of the umbilical face 
plate (arrow) was probably caused by material shrinkage during 
cryo load and was not considered to be an anomaly. 
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The separation 
ordnance device debris plunger in EO-2 was seated and appeared 
to have functioned properly. There was no significant heat 
intrusion past the ET door thermal barrier. 
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9.0 DEBRIS SLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of 13 samples were obtained from Orbiter OV-103 during 
the STS-48 post landing debris assessment at Ames-Dryden Flight 
Research Facility (ADFRF), California (Figure 15) . The 13 
submitted samples consisted of 8 Orbiter window wipes (W1-8), 1 
tile residue sample, and 4 samples from the LOX and LH2 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. The samples were analyzed by the NASA 
KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composi-
tion and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis 
involves the placing and correlating of particles with respect 
to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability. 
Debris sample results and analyses are listed by Orbiter 
location in the following summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallic particles 
2. Glass fibers (high-temperature insulation) 
3. Cerium-rich materials 
4. Paint, rust, dust and salt 
5. Organics and organic fibers 
6. Earth compounds 
7. Silica-rich materials 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (aluminum, stainless, carbon, 
steel, and steel alloys) are common to SRB/BSM exhaust 
residue, but are not considered a debris concern in 
this quantity (micrometer) and have not generated a 
known debris effect. 
2. Glass fibers (high-temperature insulation) originate 
from Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system). 
3. Cerium-rich materials originate from Orbiter window 
-	 polishing compounds. 
4. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; rust 
is an SRB/BSM exhaust residue; dust is of environmental 
origin; and salt is a naturally-occurring landing site 
product. 
5. Organics were found to be carbohydrate, starch, ester, 
nylon and Teflon (adhesive/proteinaceous origin); 
organic fibers were cellulose (sample cloth origin) 
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6. Earth compounds (muscovite, calcite, alpha-quartz, and 
Silica-Aluminum rich material) are of landing site 
origin. 
7. Silica-rich material could be from Orbiter TPS or of 
landing site origin. 
Orbiter Tile 
Results of the tile sample chemical analysis revealed the 
presence of the following materials: 
1. White silica-rich material 
2. Metallics, rust, dust and salt 
3. Organics and paint 
4. Calcite 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. White silica-rich material could originate from 
the Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS) or 
the landing site. 
2. Metallics and rust originate from SRB/BSM exhaust 
residue; dust is of environmental origin; salt is 
a landing site product. 
3. Organic material had an amorphous silica present (as 
in tile repair material); paint is of flight hardware/ 
facility/GSE origin. 
4. Calcite is of landing site origin. 
Orbiter/ET Umbilical 
Samples from the ET-Orbiter umbilicals were obtained from 
L02/LH2 umbilical plates and umbilical door inner surfaces. 
Results of the Orbiter/ET umbilical samples revealed the 
presence of the following materials: 
L02/LH2 umbilical plates 
1. Trace metallics 
2. Rust, dust and salt 
3. Silica-rich material 
4. Organics and paint 
Umbilical door inner surface 
1. Metallics 
2. Organics
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Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
L02/LH2 umbilical plates 
1. Trace metallic particles originate from SRB/BSM 
exhaust residue or ET/Orbiter separation residuals 
2. Rust is common to SRB/BSM exhaust; dust and salt are 
natural environment products. 
3. Silica-rich material could be of Orbiter TPS (thermal 
protection system) or landing site origin. 
4. Organics were of umbilical, closeout origin and Viton 
from umbilical MPS (main propulsion system) processing; 
paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin. 
Umbilical door inner surface 
1. Metallics originate from SRB/BSM exhaust residue or 
ET/Orbiter separation residuals 
2. Organics were of umbilical closeout origin and Krytox 
from umbilical MPS (main propulsin system) processing. 
Conclusions 
Orbiter TPS damage sustained on the STS-48 mission was somewhat 
greater than average. The chemical analysis results from post 
flight samples did not provide data that points to a single 
source of damaging debris. 
Orbiter window samples provided evidence of SRB/BSM exhaust, 
Orbiter TPS, Orbiter window polishing compound residue, landing 
site products, organics, and paint. Also noteworthy was the 
absence of RTV (as from Orbiter TPS) in these samples. 
The Orbiter tile sample results provided indication of thermal 
protection system (TPS) and landing site residual materials. 
The variety and trace amounts of non-TPS material did not 
provide a single source debris anomaly. Tile repair material 
was also present in the sample. 
The Orbiter/ET umbilical samples contained a variety of 
residuals. The residual variety of metallics, TPS materials, 
environmental products, and organics provides an indication, of 
this area's ability to collect and retain elements, which can 
be evaluated post flight. Residual sample location and material 
identification provided no evidence of a debris anomaly based 
on this chemical sampling.
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film review, 8 Post Launch 
Anomalies, including one IFA candidate, were observed on the 
STS-48 mission. 
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY 
1. No major items. 
10.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. No items. 
10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
1. A 2.9x2.75 area of MSA-2 was missing from two fasteners on 
the stiffener below the BSM's near the 381 ring. This divot may 
have occurred during ascent. Samples were taken for laboratory 
analysis. (SPB project item) 
2. The upper left and lower right BSM covers had locked in the 
fully opened position and then had been subsequently deformed. 
The lower right attach ring was fractured at one location. The 
upper right BSM cover was missing. The substrate at the 
fracture planes, including the threads of the exposed screws, 
were sooted. Laboratory analysis will be performed on the 
remaining attach hardware. (IFA candidate) 
3. After liftoff, 5 ordnance fragments including two NSI 
booster pieces or frangible nut webs (3 inches in length), fell 
from the HDP #5 DCS/stud hole. (SPB project item) 
4. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were 
intact and no K5NA material was missing. However, some of the 
K5NA had been applied beyond the splice plate closeout and over 
lapped the instafoam. The foam erodes or shrinks leaving the 
K5NA overlap exposed, which creates a mechanism for debris. 
(SRB project item) 
5. The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 26 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. The LH frustum exhibited 51 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. (SRB project item) 
6. Ten K5NA protective dome were missing from bolt heads on 
the aft side of the phenolic kick rings. These domes were lost 
prior to water impact and exhibited a charred substrate. (SRB 
project item)
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10.4 ORBITER 
1. Fifteen orange streaks occurred in the SSME plume during 
ascent and included the two large streaks at T+29 and T+31 
seconds MET. (Orbiter project item) 
2. SSME ignition vibration/acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from seven locations between the RH 
OMS and SS's #1/#3, one location on the aft face of the RH 
RCS stinger, and one location at the base of the RH OMS nozzle. 
A 2"xl" piece of tile surface coating material fell from the 
aft surface of the LH RCS stinger. In addition, a 4-inch 
flexible strip of material, most likely a gap filler, appeared 
to originate from tiles on the aft face of the LH OMS pod near 
the OMS nozzle. (Orbiter project item) 
n
97
NASA 
eucsarc1	 Report Documentation Page 
Soace	 rneslrat.,i 
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date 
Debris/Ice/TPS Assessment and Photographic November 1991 
Analysis of Shuttle Mission STS-48 6. Performing Organization Code 
7. Author(s)
Gregory N. Katnik
8. Performing Organization Report No. 
Scott A. Higginbotham  
J. Bradley Davis 10. Work Unit No. 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
NASA 
External Tank Mechanical
	 Systems Division
11. Contract or Grant No. 
Mail Code: TV-MSD-22 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
	 32899 13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
15. Supplementary Notes 
16. Abstract
A Debris/Ice/TPS assessment and photographic analysis was conducted 
for Space Shuttle Mission STS-48. Debris inspections of the flight 
elements and launch pad were performed before and after launch.
	 Ice/ 
frost conditions on the External Tank were assessed by the use of 
computer programs, nomographs, and infrared scanner data during 
cryogenic loading of the vehicle followed by on-pad visual
	 inspection. 
High speed photography was analyzed after launch to identify ice/debris 
sources and evaluate potential vehicle damage and/or in-flight 
anomalies. This report documents the debris/ice/TPS conditions and 
photographic analysis of Mission STS-48, and their overall effect on 
the Space Shuttle Program. 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statement 
STS-48	 Ice 
Frost	 Debris Publicly Available 
Thermal Protection System (TPS) Unclassified - Unlimited 
Photographic Analysis 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of pages 22. Price 
Unclassified Unclassified
JMM rijruv, losO u 
